Abstract
Introduction
The year 2015 marked exactly a decade since world leaders endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as part of the United Nations World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD). The AU's inclusion of this mandate was an acknowledgment, first, that Africa hosted a disproportionately large share of such 'grave circumstances' and second, that humanitarian crises could, in many cases, be attributed to violence orchestrated and perpetrated by incumbent governments against their own citizens. Article 4(h) confirmed growing concern that the traditional state-centric view of security -with its sacrosanct notion of sovereigntyprovided an impenetrable shield for abusive governments.
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A year after the AU Constitutive Act was adopted, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published their landmark report in which the concept of state sovereignty was linked inextricably to the 'Responsibility to Protect'.
Nonetheless, the process leading up to the 2010 elections proved challenging and complex.
While achievements were made on voter registration (albeit with irregularities and unrealistic targets) and the identification of Ivorian nationals, there was little progress made regarding the disarmament of rebel forces and government militia. However, postponement of the elections -for a seventh time -would have been unacceptable and provocative. 13 In spite of logistical problems and the challenges mentioned above, Côte d'Ivoire's longawaited presidential election took place on 31 October 2010, with Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane
Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédie running as candidates. Whilst the first round of elections occurred in an atmosphere free of violence, the second round pushed the country back to the brink of war. 14 Announcing the results, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
proclaimed Ouattara the winner with 54% of the vote against Gbagbo's 46%. 15 The election results were endorsed by the AU, ECOWAS and the UN. Unfortunately, and as critics had predicted, Gbagbo contested the results, claiming election fraud and vote-rigging in the northern opposition stronghold area. The Ivorian Constitutional Council then cancelled more than 660 000 votes in seven areas favourable to Ouattara and proclaimed Gbagbo the winner of the elections. 16 In the midst of the political stalemate, the country once again descended into violence, with large scale loss of life and displacement of people.
By 24 March 2011 the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, confirmed that 'more than 460 people have been killed, and many more wounded… An estimated 500 000 people have been displaced inside the country, and over 90 000 have fled the country'. 17 By June 2011, some 187 266
Ivorians had fled the country and the death toll had increased to more than 3000. 18 For the most part, the international community stood united in recognising Ouattara as the elected president of Côte d'Ivoire and in condemning the acts of violence against civilians.
However, judged by the background to the conflict and the sheer amount of information available prior to the elections, the parties themselves and the international community failed to adhere to the first (and arguably most important) sub-responsibility of R2P, namely the responsibility to prevent. from the initiatives previously described, it seems that no opportunity was created for the AU and ECOWAS to come together to discuss, and jointly take decisions about, appropriate measures to resolve the crisis.
Aning and Atuobi 35 conclude that the lack of unity of response, duplication of efforts and confusion between the two regional bodies that were supposed to find an African solution to the Ivorian crisis, hindered their effectiveness and any leadership role they could have played.
Undertaking different ad hoc mediation initiatives, with no clear line of cooperation and coordination, undermined their efforts to resolve the conflict and decreased the bargaining power associated with a coordinated strategy. 36 ECOWAS' military chiefs and member states knew the organisation could not undertake military intervention, hence their prudent request to the UNSC to take action. However, it was only after requesting the UNSC to fulfill its primary responsibility that ECOWAS requested the AU Commission to establish the AU-ECOWAS joint facilitation team. 37 In sum, and not necessarily intentionally, ECOWAS undermined the AU's leadership role in resolving the conflict.
In terms of subsidiarity, it would have been judicious for ECOWAS to take the lead in mediation -under a clearly defined AU mandate and official endorsement -because of its comparative advantage in the West African region. Given the non-existence of a rapid deployment force on the continent, a unified position would also have afforded them more leverage to take joint ownership of the various resolutions introduced by the UNSC. A number of AU member states, many of whom have served on the PSC (the highest decision making body on peace and security in Africa) have governments that perpetrate human rights abuses against their own citizens and these governments use the traditional Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference as a rhetorical shield against international accountability. 58 In fact, Côte d'Ivoire itself was serving a two-year term on the PSC when the conflict broke out. Indeed, although the AU member states formally declared their commitment to R2P at the continental level, inter alia through the Ezulwini Consensus, many of them have not incorporated its provisions at the national level. Regrettably, the AU lacks an effective monitoring and sanctions system to punish non-compliance. 59 Another important obstacle that impedes the AU's effectiveness is lack of unity. In the Ivorian case, following the electoral deadlock, Angola, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa sided with Gbagbo, contradicting the AU's position which requested Gbagbo's departure and respect of the electoral outcome. 60 Such tensions occur in any intergovernmental organisation dealing with competing national interests; nonetheless they undermined the credibility of the AU and its ability to reach consensus regarding the preferred line of action to end a humanitarian crisis.
Why was
Considering all this, it was not surprising that the PSC was not able to act authoritatively to resolve the Ivorian crisis.
The Continental Early Warning System and the Ivorian crisis
Based on analysis of the communiqués, press releases, speeches and reports of the former Protocol, 63 the CEWS is mandated 'to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts'.
On this account, one can conclude that it may have been the CEWS that failed to anticipate and prevent the post-electoral crisis. However, due to the lack of information on the CEWS' role in the PSC handling of the conflict, one cannot conclusively determine whether the failure was at the level of early warning or at the level of early action or lack of will of the relevant decisions makers to act on the early warning provided.
All this notwithstanding, it is difficult to downplay the challenges currently facing the CEWS. Member states' insistence on sovereignty and non-interference often hinders the collection of reliable information on conflict markers within their domestic jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which must act as the complementary elements of the CEWS, function at different levels of development and operationalisation.
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The Panel of the Wise and the Ivorian crisis
According to the AU Peace and Security Protocol: Instead of drawing on the PoW, the AU set up two ad hoc mediation processes to resolve the crisis. However, while the AU mediation efforts were symbolically important, the organisation's choice of mediators raised concerns and the appointment of Mbeki and Odinga, respectively, was puzzling on many accounts.
On the one hand, although Mbeki's mediation during the 2002 civil war achieved quick success, during the 2010-2011 crisis he was forced to withdraw following accusations of bias in favour of Gbagbo. 67 Keeping this in mind, it is hard to imagine a scenario where he would have been able to convince the parties, especially the Ouattara camp, to accept his recommended negotiated settlement. In addition, from the beginning of the conflict it was highly unlikely that the parties and the international community would agree to a powersharing solution; this was so particularly because none of the parties was willing to engage in negotiation, let alone admit defeat. Furthermore, it can be argued that neither the AU nor ECOWAS nor the UN was willing to accept a power-sharing deal that would once again leave Gbagbo in power, especially because since 2003 the Ivorian government had been (ostensibly) a unity government with Gbagbo as president. 68 On the other hand, Odinga prior to his appointment by the AU had publicly expressed partiality, and repeatedly criticised the AU's preference for a peaceful solution. Already on 17 December 2010, during a press conference ten days before his appointment as the AU Special Envoy, Odinga stated, 'Gbagbo must be forced out, even if it means by military force… The AU should not be lamenting all the time… The AU should develop teeth'. 69 Although his assessment of the situation might have been justifiable, it nonetheless highlights that prior to his appointment, Odinga had no faith in the mandate he was chosen to implement. It is important therefore to note that although Mbeki and Odinga's expertise and experience in mediation are not being questioned, it certainly did not help that both were partial towards one of the parties and at times openly contradicted the position of the AU.
To be clear, at the operational level every conflict situation is different and thus there cannot be 'a one size fits all solution' to mediation. However, hasty and ad hoc mediations, with no clarity regarding criteria for mediators' selection, have proven to be ineffective and unsustainable in preventing conflict on the continent. The delay and lack of political will to operationalise the ASF 76 imply that the AU lacks the enforcement means to undertake forceful intervention when the need arises -as was the case with the Ivorian crisis. As a consequence of these shortcomings, the AU tends to avoid reference to Article 4(h) or the R2P, and when it undertakes peace missions they tend to be ad hoc, with no clear vision and sustainability. The fear of not being able to respond credibly with the proper and appropriate capabilities, and the probability of bringing greater risks might be a reason behind the AU's hesitancy to mention Article 4(h) or R2P in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Notwithstanding these factors, due to the current level of instability and the recurrence of conflicts on the continent, the importance of the ASF cannot be overstated.
Despite this reality, peace operations in Africa are underfunded.
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The Peace Fund and the Ivorian crisis
Consideration of the challenges facing the Peace Fund can help elucidate some of the problems the AU and its organs faced in its handling of the Ivorian conflict.
Since its genesis, the AU has suffered from a chronic and perpetual lack of financial resources. 78 The scope of this article has not allowed for in-depth discussion of the wider African discourse on R2P, and it is important to note that there are many critics who consider R2P intervention to be a ruse used by powerful states to pursue their national interests. 82 Notwithstanding the debate, one would expect that a normative concept that emerged from the continent of Africa, and which is enshrined in the charter of the AU and speaks directly to Africa's grim realities, would be invoked by African leaders to stop mass atrocities whenever and wherever they occur on the continent. The Ivorian post-election humanitarian crisis of 2010/2011 offered a text-book opportunity for the AU to show its commitment to Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, where R2P had been incorporated at the legal-institutional level a decade earlier. However, as it turned out, not one of the organisation's peace and security architecture components was utilised to any significant degree in responding to the crisis.
The pervasive lack of capacity within the organisation was clearly, as it continues to be, a major stumbling block to implementation of R2P in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. But surely, in the face of a capacity deficit, the AU should have spearheaded the appeal to the UN Security
Council to intervene. The UNSC has primary responsibility for international peace and security and the AU could therefore, in full compliance with international law, have shifted the burden of intervention onto the UNSC.
The AU's political response to the crisis was even more troubling, and deeply incongruous.
While Côte d'Ivoire was clearly an R2P case, the AU did not invoke the principle explicitly at any point during the conflict, and neither did it articulate a clear position on the possibility of military action. As R2P proponents would rush to point out, military intervention should only be considered as a last resort, when all other means have failed to protect populations at risk. In this regard it is important to recall that, inasmuch as the AU never considered military intervention, it welcomed UNSC Resolution 1975 which gave UNOCI an offensive mandate, and even encouraged UNOCI to 'vigorously' implement this mandate. It would seem that the AU was complacent about playing a secondary role not only to the UNSC, but even to ECOWAS (prior to the intervention) and France, throughout the crisis.
That being the case, the argument can be made that the AU's reluctance to invoke R2P or its own Constitutive Act's Article 4(h), had been a conscious omission. It also strengthens criticism that the organisation remains unwilling -and not simply unable -to intervene in any of its member states, regardless of the severity of the crisis. Despite its ostensible 
